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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Today's world is marked by continuous movements of
integration, as countries around the globe try to come
closer to each other in the economical , social and
political arenas. Examples of these movements are the North
American Free Trade Agreement and the European Community.
If countries are to become closer to each other, it is
essential to increase the understanding of our different
legal systems.
Traditionally, the legal systems of the world have
been classified in two main groups, the Common Law systems
and the Civil Law systems. Legal scholars distinguish these
systems based on their origins. The Civil Law systems
emerged from the Roman Law, while Common Law systems
derived mainly from England. Another difference between
these systems results from their attitudes towards stare
decisis. Common law countries consider precedent a source
of binding rules, while other legal systems do not. Legal
experts also point to the codification movement typical of
civil law countries as a difference between both types of
legal orders.
Nevertheless authors like Neil MacCormick consider
the methods for legal reasoning to be almost the same in
2all legal systems. The series of steps that a judge takes
to determine the rule applicable to a legal dispute do not
change substantially from country to country. In other
words, once the judge determines that the facts of the case
are similar to those regulated by a certain rule, he will
apply that particular rule and resolve the dispute
accordingly, regardless of the source of the rule.
Therefore, the differences between the legal systems of the
world are not of kind but of degree. 1
With this idea in mind, and in an attempt to increase
understanding of the American legal system, the purpose of
the present work is to give an overview of the role of
precedent, as a source of law, in the legal system of the
United States. This thesis also points out some of the
differences between the legal system of Mexico (a civil
law country) and the system of the United States (a common
law country) . The differences between these legal systems
result mostly from the preeminence of precedent as a source
of law in the United States. Consequently, the present work
aims to describe the role of the Constitution, statutes and
precedent as sources of law in the legal system of the
United States, and the reasons why precedent is considered
the preeminent source of law in the American system.
To achieve this purpose, it is necessary to start with
a definition of "sources of law". This will be the
1 NEIL MACCORMICK, LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL THEORY 230 (1978
3objective of the first chapter. We will define precedent as
a formal source of law, that is, as a direct source of
binding rules. We will also explain the relationship
between precedent and the other formal sources of law in
the system: the Constitution, statutes enacted by the
legislature and the common law.
In the second chapter, we will deal with the doctrine
of stare decisis, its origins in England and how it has
developed in the United States. We will review the
importance of judicial decisions in a system that follows
the principle of stare decisis. The final part of this
chapter will explain the advantages of stare decisis in
promoting fairness, stability, predictability and
efficiency in the legal system.
In order to prevent stare decisis from being an
instrument of undue rigidity, judges must balance the need
for stability with the need to adapt to changes in society.
Judges have the task of interpreting the existing rules and
adapting them to the particular case at hand. In doing so
judges frequently update the legal system. The role of
precedent in striking this balance and updating the legal
system when it is necessary is the subject of the fourth
chapter
.
The fifth chapter deals with the interplay of
precedent and statutes as sources of law. Although in this
century the number of statutes has increased, precedent
4remains the preeminent source of law. We will begin this
chapter by defining statutes as sources of law, and then
address the problems presented by their ambiguity and the
need for case law to interpret statutes and to apply them
to particular disputes. This chapter also deals with the
importance of case law as a means of updating statutes and
judges' powers of constitutional review of legislation.
As the following pages explain, the use of precedent
as the primary material for legal reasoning gives to the
legal system of the United States its particular features.
CHAPTER II
THE SOURCES OF LAW
Introduction
Before dealing with the role of precedent as a source
of law in the legal system of the United States, it is
important to define the term "source of law". This term is
given various meanings that could easily lead to confusion
in this thesis. Therefore the first part of this chapter
defines "source of law" according to the objectives set
forth in the general introduction.
The second part of this chapter offers an overview of
the main sources of law in the American legal system. It
also explains the origins of these sources, their functions
and the elements that distinguish them. This chapter also
deals with the supremacy of the Constitution and the
distinction between constitutional supremacy and the
preeminence of precedents as a "source of law" in the
American legal system.
Definition of the Term "Source of Law"
The term "source of law" is one of the most ambiguous
in jurisprudence. Legal scholars use this term to define the
reasons why a law was created, the institutions that create
the law or the body of the law itself. The ambiguity of the
term can easily lead to confusion. For example, Professor
Silving in her book, Sources of Law , considers statutes,
precedents, customary law, records, reports, rules of
procedure, legal doctrine, philosophy of nature, and
philosophy of law as sources of law. 2
Conseguently, it is necessary to clearly define what we
consider a "source of law" in order to avoid confusion as to
the scope and purposes of the present work.
Legal scholars have classified the sources of law into
two main groups, formal and material. A material source is
the cause or influence that explains the existence of a
certain rule. Moral, economical or social reasons are
usually considered the material sources of the law. On the
other hand, in its formal sense, the term "source" refers to
a criterion of legal validity in a certain legal system. 3
In Kelsen's words:
Actually, however, only the positive reason for the
validity of a legal norm, that is, the higher positive
legal norm that regulates its creation is called
"source". In this sense, the constitution is the source
of the general legal norms created by the legislation
- HELEN SILVING, THE SOURCES OF LAW 1 (1968)
3 H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 246 (1961)
7or custom; a general legal norm is the source of the
judicial decision by which the general norm is applied;
but the judicial decision in itself may be regarded as
the source of the obligation or the right of the
contending parties established by the decision, or as
the source of the authorization of the organ who has to
execute this decision. According to a positivistic
theory of law, the source of law can only be law. 4
In the present work, we will use the term source of
law in its formal sense. As a result, "sources of law" as
used in this work, will not include prevailing moral values
or economic conditions, or what is usually referred to as
natural law. Rather, the formal definition of the "source of
law" refers to a group of rules that determine how and by
whom the rest of the rules in the legal system are created.
These sources have the unique attribute of being binding. 5
They are the authoritative forms of expression of precepts
and doctrines to which courts are referred in the decision
of controversies. 6
The fact that this thesis is limited to a formal
definition of the sources of law does not mean that we do
not consider morals, history, politics or economics as
important elements in legal reasoning, but only that these
other factors are not regarded as binding sources of rules.
These considerations simply play a different role in the
legal system than formal sources of law.
4 HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 233 (2nd ed. 1960)
5 Id.
6 3 POUND ROSCOE, JURISPRUDENCE 383 (1959).
8The Formal Sources of Law in the Legal System of the United
States
In modern legal systems, the sources of the law are
multiple and commonly include a written Constitution,
statutory law and judicial precedents. The American legal
system is no exception, although its complexity is increased
by the fact that it is a federal system in which the state
and federal systems coexist.
Thus there are three main formal sources of law in the
legal system of the United States: the Constitution,
statutes, and precedents. These three bodies of law contain
binding rules that regulate all governmental acts within the
system.
The Constitution
Black's Law Dictionary defines a constitution as:
The organic and fundamental law of a nation
establishing the character and conception of its
government, laying the basic principles to which its
internal life is to be conformed, organizing the
government, and regulating, distributing and limiting
the functions of its different departments and
prescribing the extent and manner of the exercise of
power
.
[In the case of the United States] it is a written
instrument agreed upon by the people of the Union and
in opposition of which any act or ordinance of any
officer is null and void. 7
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 215 (6th ed. 1990)
9According to this definition, the Constitution serves
two main purposes. First, it determines the organization and
functions of the State. The Constitution prescribes the
separation of powers, assigning enumerated powers to the
main branches of government (Executive, Legislative and
Judicial) and providing for numerous checks and balances
among them. Examples of these checks and balances include
the President's veto power in the legislative process8
, the
reguirement of the advice and consent of two thirds of the
Senate in making treaties 9 and Congress 7 power to limit and
regulate the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. 10
Second, the Constitution creates a series of limits on
governmental actions. Examples of these limits include the
Bill of Rights, including its protection of freedom of
speech and religion. The Constitution is a formal source of
law, since it determines the structure of the government,
the power granted to each branch and the binding limits on
these powers. The Supremacy Clause, 11 not only defines the
Constitution as a source of law, but also grants the
Constitution the highest place in the hierarchy of formal
sources . It provides
:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all
Treaties made or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
8 U.S. CONST, art. I, $7.
9 U.S. CONST, art. II, $2.
10 U.S. CONST, art. Ill, $2
11 U.S. CONST, art. VI, $2.
10
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of
any State to the contrary notwithstanding.
From this provision, the Constitution acguires its
force as the supreme source of binding norms in the system.
The Constitution determines the limits of the validity of
all other sources of law. All other rules in the system have
to be created according to the Constitution, which enjoys
legal superiority over any conflicting law. For example, if
a State were to enact a statute that prohibited the teaching
of foreign languages , the statute would be void because it
would conflict with the right of liberty granted by the
fourteen amendment .
*
2
If the Constitution is the source of validity for the
rest of the rules in the legal system, who should determine
when a certain law is unconstitutional? The guestion is
answered in the case Marbury v. Madison, 13 a case that
determined that a federal act was against the powers granted
by Congress in the Constitution and in conseguence void. 14
As Chief Justice Marshall explained in Marbury:
The constitution is either a superior paramount law,
unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is on a level
with ordinary legislative acts, and, like other acts,
is alterable when the legislature shall please to alter
it. If the former part of the alternative be true, then
a legislative act contrary to the constitution is not
law. . . . Certainly all those who have framed written
constitutions contemplate them as forming the
fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and
12 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
13 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
14ALAN FARNSWORTH, INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE UNITED STATES
4 (2nd ed. 1987) .
11
consequently the theory of every such government must
be, that an act of the legislature repugnant to the
constitution is void. This theory is essentially
attached to a written constitution, and, is
consequently, to be considered, by this court, as one
of the fundamental principles of our society.
1
5
Marbury v. Madison gives the judicial branch the power
to declare void any act by the national or state governments
that does not conform with the provisions of the
Constitution. Chief Justice Marshall explained in this same
case the justification for judicial review:
It is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is. Those who
apply the rule to particular cases, must out of
necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two laws
conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the
operation of each. ... This is of the very essence of
the judicial duty. If, then, the courts are to regard
the constitution, and the constitution is superior to
any act of the legislature, the constitution and not
such act must govern the case to which they both
apply. 16
Consequently, if the judicial branch is to determine
what the law is, and the Constitution is not only a formal
source of law but also the supreme source for the validity
of all the rules in the legal system, it is the judge's duty
to insure that every act of the government is in accordance
with the Constitution. The validity of the rest of the
system depends upon its accordance with the precepts of the
Constitution.
15 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.(1 Cranch) 137,140 (1803)
16 5 U.S.(1 Cranch) 137, 143 (1803).
12
Statutes
A statute is defined as: "...the written will of the
legislature, solemnly expressed according to the forms
necessary to constitute it as the law of the State." 17
At the national level, the will of the legislature
constitutes a source of law because the Constitution grants
Congress a list of powers, such as the power to regulate
interstate commerce, coin money, and establish post
offices. 18 These powers are exercised through the creation
of statutes. In addition, the Constitution provides that
Congress can make all the laws that are necessary and proper
for carrying into execution the powers expressly vested. 19
Every act of Congress, in order to be valid, must be
created in accordance with the Constitution and follow the
process established by it. Therefore, every act of Congress,
in order to be constitutional , should result in written
general rules of conduct created in accordance with the
powers granted in the Constitution.
As Chief Justice Burger explained in INS v. Chadha, 20
the framers conceived the legislative process as a "means to
preserve freedom by making the exercise of power subject to
the carefully crafted restraints spelled out in the
Constitution." 21 In particular, the framers established a
17 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 981 (6th ed. 1990).
18 These powers, like most of the powers of Congress, are enumerated in
U.S. CONST, art. I, $8.
19 Id.
20 462 U.S. 919 (1983)
.
21 Id.
13
bicameral legislature formed by a House of Representatives
and a Senate. The Senate is made up of two senators from
every state who are elected to six-year terms. In contrast,
members of the House of Representatives serve for two-year
terms and represent a certain proportion of the population
of the country. Each chamber serves as a check on the other
since the enactment of legislation requires approval of the
majority of both houses. 22
The legislative process, very briefly, consists of a
procedure by which a legislator from either house introduces
a bill that she wishes to become law. If a committee
approves the proposal for legislative consideration, the
bill is brought before the chamber for debate. If the bill
is approved by a majority vote, it is sent to the other
chamber which follows essentially the same procedure. After
approval by both houses the bill is sent to the President
for his signature. The President has ten days during which
he can either exercise his veto power or sign the bill. If
he signs, it becomes law. 23
The legislative process results in long discussions,
during which the members of political parties with different
interests negotiate in order to achieve their goals. This
process frequently results in statutes that lack clarity. 24
Furthermore, statutes are created to regulate a vast number
22 FARNSWORTH, supra note 14, at 57.
23For further details of the legislative process see U.S. CONST, art. I
24 ALAN WATSON, SOURCES OF LAW, LEGAL CHANGE AND AMBIGUITY 17 (1983)
.
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of future situations. Consequently, they are usually
expressed in broad and general terms. 25 For these reasons,
statutes often require further interpretation in their
application to a particular case.
For example, in Athanasaw v. United States26 the Court
held that causing a girl to be transported from Georgia to
Florida, ostensibly for the purpose of appearing as a chorus
girl in a theater operated by the defendant, involved
"debauchery" within the meaning of the Mann Act. There was
evidence of improper advances made to the girl upon her
arrival; the advances were related to her membership in the
theater group. The Supreme Court held that the term
"debauchery" in the Act did not mean only intercourse, but
"was designed to reach acts which might ultimately lead to
that phase of debauchery which consisted of sexual
actions.
"
27
This example does not teach that statutes are not
sources of law; it merely shows that, in order to determine
a statute's applicability to a specific situation, courts
must often engage in further interpretation. 28 Courts are
responsible for the interpretation of statutes and applying
them to particular cases. Theoretically statutes are of
conclusive authority upon the judge. In reality, their
25 Id. at 19.
26 227 U.S. 326 (1913)
.
27 Athanasaw v. United States, 227 U.S. 326, 330 (1913). This case is
discussed in EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 41
(1949) .
29 FARNSWORTH, supra note 14, at 65.
15
effect is largely controlled by the interpretations put upon
them by courts. 29
The interplay of statutes and precedents will be
addressed in the last chapter. For the moment we should make
clear that statutes are the source of law produced by the
legislative branch. Due to their freguently high level of
generality, their role in regulating often unforseeable
future situations, and their emergence from a partisan
process marked by legislative compromise, statutes often
require interpretation. This interpretation is done by the
courts
.
Apart from acts of Congress, the executive branch
creates norms of a legislative nature. The President has a
limited power to issue executive orders. Federal
administrative bodies may also be empowered to make rules
and regulations of a legislative character, which if made
pursuant to statutes have the force of law. 30 Many examples
of this type of regulation can be found in environmental
law, 31 such as the power granted by the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act to
the Environmental Protection Agency to issue regulations
designating as hazardous those substances that when released
29 Alexander Lincoln, Relation of Judicial Decisions to Law, 21 HARV. L,
Rev. 122 (1908).
30 FARNSWORTH, supra note 14, at 56.
31 ROGER W. FINDLEY ET AL
.
, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN A NUTSHELL 59 (3 th.
ed. 1992)
.
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in the environment may present a substantial danger to the
public health or welfare or the environment. 32
Since these executive actions have a legislative
character can be considered as belonging to the same formal
source of law generally defined as statutes. Consequently,
in this thesis we will limit our analysis to the statutory
law.
Precedents
A precedent is defined as "[an] adjudged case or
decision of a court, considered as furnishing an example or
authority for an identical or similar case arising
afterwards or a similar question of law." 33
Precedents are sources of rules established by a court
for a particular type of case and thereafter referred to in
deciding similar cases. 34 Just as statutes are the result of
the law-creative powers of the legislative branch,
precedents result from the law-creative powers of the
judicial branch. These rules, made by judges, are also
called case law.
In the American system, the case-deciding process plays
a double role. First, the decision issued by a judge has the
purpose of resolving a specific case presented to the court.
Second, and due to the fact that rules are derivable from
3
- id.
33 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 815 (6th ed. 1990)
34 Id. at 815.
17
the judge's opinion, a precedent can become relevant for
resolving future cases. This second element becomes
especially important when we recall that precedents
establish binding principles under the doctrine of stare
decisis. 35
Case law results in the creation of precedents that
have two main purposes. First, judges through their opinions
determine the individual norms for resolving the particular
case at hand, and thereby a legal situation is created for
that case which did not exist before the decision. 36 Hence
judges create law in the process of solving legal disputes.
Second, precedents frequently establish general rules that
can be used in resolving future cases. It should be clear
that in both instances case law is formed of a group of
rules which are formal sources of law.
Precedents, as formal sources of law, are of
especially great importance in the United States, because
American legal tradition empowers judges to resolve
conflicts even where no statute or constitutional provision
addresses the problem. 37 This area of law, regulated in its
entirety by judge made law, is called common law. Judges
resolve conflicts by reasoning from cases that other judges
35 MACCORMICK, supra note 1, at 215.
36 See KELSEN, supra note 4, at 238: "Only the lack of insight into the
normative function of the judicial decision, only the prejudice that the
law consists merely of general norms, only the ignoring of the existence
of individual legal norms obscured the fact that the judicial decision
is a continuation of the law creating process, and has led to the error
to see it in a merely declaratory function."
37LIEF H. CARTER, REASON IN LAW 117 (3 th. ed. 1988)
.
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have decided in the past and from the rules that emerge from
them. As Lief Carter explains:
In calling common law judge made law we mean that, for
a variety of historical reasons, a large body of legal
rules and principles exist because judges without
legislative help have created them. As long as judges
continue to apply them, they continue to recreate them
with each application.-'
This body of legal rules covers important areas
including much of the law of contracts, property and torts.
At the federal level the areas in which federal courts have
applied common law most frequently include admiralty and
maritime cases; disputes between citizens of different
states; proceedings raising matters of international
relations; actions involving gaps in federal statutory
provisions and cases concerning the legal relations and
proprietary interests of the United States. 39
In these areas of law judges use precedent as a
starting point for their reasoning. Precedents are the
sources of the rules that judges adapt to the case at bench
Professor Levi explains the process:
The first stage is the creation of a legal concept
which is built up as cases are compared. The period is
one in which the court fumbles for a phrase. Several
phrases may be tried out; the misuse or
misunderstanding of words itself may have an effect.
The concept sounds like another, and the jump to the
second is made. The second stage is a period when the
concept is more or less fixed, although reasoning by
example continues to classify items inside and out of
38 Id. at 122.
39 JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET . AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 224 (2nd ed. 1993).
19
the concept. The third stage is a breakdown of the
concept, as reasoning by example has moved so far ahead
as to make it clear that the suggestive influence of
the word is no longer desired. 4 '-'
The fact that whole areas of law are regulated in their
entirety by judge made law shows the preeminence of this
source of law in the legal system. Moreover, precedents not
only provide rules for resolving cases under the common law,
but judges also use them as sources of interpretation of
ambiguously worded rules whose origin can lie in either the
Constitution, a statute, or the common law. In these cases
the judicial interpretation assumes the character of a
general norm that can be applied in resolving future
cases. 41 For example, a constitutional right of privacy
results from cases such as Griswold v. Connecticut.^ 2 This
concept of a fundamental right to privacy that derives from
the Bill of Rights, but is only expressed in case law, has
been applied in many subseguent cases, including the
landmark abortion case, Roe v. IVade. 43
Precedents determine the applicability of the rules
that derive from all the formal sources of law. This gives
them a preeminent role in the legal system of the United
States. The direct source of rules to be applied in a
particular case is, in many cases, a precedent. Moreover,
40 LEVI, supra note 27, at 9.
41 KELSEN, supra note 4, at 250.
42 381 U.S. 510 (1965). In this case the Court held that the Bill of
Rights protected marital privacy as a fundamental right, in particular
the right of a married couple to use contraceptives.
43 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The Court stated that there is a fundamental
freedom of choice in the basic decisions of one's life respecting
marriage, divorce, procreation and contraception.
20
precedent is the sole source of law in the common law. The
precedent-oriented nature of common law systems,
particularly in the United States, is the topic of this
thesis, and will be explored at length in the subsequent
chapters
.
It is important to make the distinction between
precedent as the predominant sources of law in the American
legal system and the supremacy of the United States
Constitution. The point is that the immediate source of
rules in resolving cases frequently is a precedent, because
precedents often supply the most specific and focused legal
rules applicable to concrete cases. But the determination of
validity of the norms is always controlled by the
Constitution, although it is not always applied directly. In
other words, the precise rule applicable to a case, even on
constitutional matters, frequently is found in case law.
Therefore, while the United States Constitution is the
supreme law of the land, precedents play the preeminent role
in actual decionmaking in the legal system of the United
States.
Summary
The main formal sources of law of the legal system of
the United States are the Constitution, statutory law and
case law. The Constitution not only determines the power of
the different branches of government, but also establishes
21
limits to the validity of the rest of the norms in the
system. For this reason, the Constitution is considered the
supreme law of the land. The control of the other sources is
achieved through judicial review resulting in a group of
rules that are part of the case law.
The rules that are the product of the legislative
process, as well as those from the executive branch,
constitute the second source of law in the American legal
system. These rules frequently require interpretation to
determine their applicability to a specific case. This
interpretation is done by the judges, sometimes through
written opinions that later become part of the case law.
Case law results from the power granted to judges not
only to resolve particular cases, but also to interpret the
rules from other legal sources. The preeminence of precedent
is evident since the applicability of constitutional and
statutory law depends on interpretations made by judges.
Moreover, the area of law called common law is controlled,
in its entirety, by judge-made law. The important role of
precedent in the legal system is the topic of the rest of
this study.
CHAPTER III
PRECEDENT AS A SOURCE OF LAW IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM
OF THE UNITED STATES
Introduction
This chapter will deal with the role of precedent in
the legal system of the United States, and how case law is
used to resolve legal disputes. We will also explain the
doctrine of stare decisis, which gives precedent the
attributes that enable it to be a formal source of law. Some
legal scholars regard a given state's attitude toward stare
decisis as a principal touchstone to determine whether it is
a common law or a civil law system. 44 Conseguently , stare
decisis is of great relevance in explaining the role of
precedent in the legal system.
The first part of this chapter offers a review of the
origin of stare decisis and the attributes it gives to the
legal system. The second part of this chapter deals with
stare decisis as applied today in the United States, as well
as the definitions of ratio, holding and dicta. Finally, we
44 RUDOLPH B. SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW 87 (4th. ed. 1980)
22
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will analyze the justifications for the doctrine of stare
decisis.
Definition of Stare Decisis and its Development
STARE DECISIS ET NON QUIETA MOVERE
"To adhere to precedent and not to unsettle things
which are settled": 45 this is the command of the principle
of stare decisis. The doctrine creates a duty on the part of
judges to rely on former decisions as the source of rules to
resolve legal disputes. Nevertheless, this principle was not
clearly established as a rule to limit the judge's action
until the nineteenth century.
During the eighteenth century, stare decisis was a
principle of adhering to decisions as a whole, not to set
rules. Lawyers and judges thought that principles of truth
derived from natural law, and were only announced in
precedents. The predominant view of the role of precedent
was that the courts only declared the "custom of the realm"
through their opinions. 46
Judges in England relied on custom that the royal
courts had recognized and tried to apply uniformly.
Precedents were the public record of the use and practice of
45 MILES 0. PRICE & BITNER HARRY, EFFECTIVE LEGAL RESEARCH 98 (1969)
46 LAURENCE GOLDSTEIN , PRECEDENT IN LAW 36 (1987)
.
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the realm. 47 During the eighteenth century theorists such as
Hume believed that in the use of precedent "what is common
is not the set of rules, but the process of reasoning from
the particulars of the common life." 48 Case law exemplified
this process of reasoning, but was not necessarily binding.
Judges were bound only by natural law; they were not bound
by precedent per se as a positive source of rules. 49
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the
principle of stare decisis became stricter. Three main
functional concerns underlay this development: first, courts
increasingly felt a need to protect citizens who relied on
earlier judicial pronouncements; second, a stricter
adherence to precedent allowed lawyers to advise clients and
prepare cases with more certainty; finally, close attention
to previous cases helped assure uniformity in judicial
decisions. 50
As a result of these forces, during the first half of
the last century, decisions started to be considered
binding. An example of this change is the case Bright v.
Hutton,51 in which the House of Lords held that it was bound
by its own precedents.
This change in the perception of the function of case
law also accorded with the contemporaneous emergence of
47 Id. at 16.
48 D. HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 502 (2nd ed. 1978)
.
49 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 4 6, at 40.
50 Id. at 56.
51 3 HL Cas 341 (1852). This case is discussed in GOLDSTEIN, supra note
46, at 55.
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positivist theories of law. Authors like Austin and Hobbes
argued that the idea of preestablished natural law, which
judges merely discovered, was a fallacy. 52 Positivists also
favored an approach toward the law that would result in more
precise rules for guiding conduct. In Hobbes' view:
Where the law is silent, where there is no
directly declared will of the sovereign, judges are
authorized to declare law in his name, doing so, in the
course of adjudicating particular cases. They establish
new rules of law, which are thereby authoritative and
preemptory in the same way as the sovereign's commands
are. 5 -*
This definition regards precedent as a source of binding
rules. One reason for following case law is that society's
expectations are fixed by preestablished rules, that is, by
precedent. 54
Due to the popularity of positivist theory toward the
end of the nineteenth century, the idea of precedent as a
source of rules became widely accepted within the legal
community. The courts not only considered themselves bound
by their own precedents, but also by the decisions of
coordinate jurisdictions. 55 They established the principle
that if a lower court erred it was the task of the superior
court to correct the error. 56 Through such developments, a
strong notion of the principle of stare decisis emerged.
52 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 46, at 25.
53 T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 320 (C.B. MACPHERSON ed. , 1968).
54 Neil MacCormick, Why Cases Have Rationes and What these Are, in
PRECEDENT IN LAW 155 (Laurence Goldstein ed., 1990).
55 CARTER, supra note 37, at 121.
56 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 46, at 57.
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If precedent is considered a source of rules for
resolving future disputes, it becomes important to keep a
record of what the precedents are. Although judicial records
were kept as early as the sixteenth century, when Bracton
and his successors began the tradition of writing down the
conclusions of the courts and using these writings as guides
for future judicial decisions, the widespread recording of
judicial opinions did not become common until much later. 57
Once precedents were considered binding sources of law, it
became necessary to keep an exact record of the case law. As
stare decisis became a binding rule for judges and lawyers,
the use of court reports grew. Today they constitute a great
body of authoritative materials.
The early English reports organized case law,
classifying it by the name of the parties, the name of the
deciding court and the date of the decision. Each report
started with a summary of the proceedings, the decision on
the specific issues and a statement of the facts. 58 Then
came the judge's opinion, which stated the rules used in
resolving the case, as well as the reasons for applying
them. 59 Essentially the same method of reporting decisions,
with even greater accessibility provided by electronic
databases, is used today.
57 CARTER, supra note 37, at 155.
58 WATSON, supra note 24, at 46.
59 KARL LLEWELLYN, THE CASE LAW SYSTEM IN AMERICA 21 (1989)
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Now that we reviewed the origin of the doctrine of
stare decisis, and how it developed to be considered a
binding rule, we will concentrate on the way it is used in
the United States.
Development of the Doctrine of Stare Decisis in the United
States
Contemporary American adjudication derives from
English royal courts. Until the American revolution, the
English system itself was used in the colonies. Therefore
the doctrine of stare decisis existed in America as detailed
in the previous section.
Nevertheless, in the post-revolutionary period,
American lawyers developed a legal methodology to guestion
the soundness of the English precedents. 60 Due to the
eagerness of the new country to separate from its former
oppressor, lawyers in the United States adopted a position
which reguired strict adherence to precedents established by
the national courts, while permitting English precedents to
be guestioned. 61
Judges used this modified theory of stare decisis when
strict adherence to precedent would have prohibited
consideration of local laws and costumes, or when the
60 CRAIG E. KLAFTER, REASON OVER PRECEDENT, ORIGIN OF AMERICAN LEGAL
THOUGHT 67 (1993)
.
61 Id. at 68.
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English precedents were in conflict with each other. This
new conception of stare decisis is best explained by Justice
Tapping Reeve, a judge of the time, who explained:
The law of England . . . must with great property be
deemed our law; for our ancestors came from that
country bringing with them the legal notions that
prevail today; which have ever been considered the
common law of this country, unless altered by our own
legislation, or so manifestly improper to be received,
arising from widely differing local circumstances, that
our courts have been obliged to reject them, to attain
the ends of justice, for which all laws are made. But
in a case where reason is the same, and as strong in
this country as that, and of equal applicability to our
circumstances as theirs the law is the same. 62
This modified conception of stare decisis gave
important interpretative powers to the judge. The judge
could determine that a certain precedent had not become part
of the legal system of the United States and thereby
establish a new direction in the law.
Another significant change in doctrine resulted from
the use of the Constitution as a standard against which to
interpret case law and statutes. 63 The power of judicial
review gave judges the ability to depart from stare decisis,
when the precedent conflicted with the supreme law of the
land. For example, in Jones v. the Commonwealth, 3 Va. 234
(1792), Judge Roane rejected a judgment that condemned
defendants as a group rather than as individuals, stating:
This is so unjust and contrary to the Bill of
Rights that even if it was established by adjudged
62 Peck v. Lockwood, 5 Day 22, 26 (1811;
63 KLAFTER, supra note 60, at 86.
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cases to be the law... I should be of the opinion that
it should be declared unconstitutional. 64
Judges used judicial review to expand the power of the
judiciary as compared to the other branches of government.
Of course, this attitude triggered vehement opposition in
and out of the court house. The conflict between judicial
conservatism and judicial activism persists today and
divides not only judges , but many legal experts in the
United States.
Stare Decisis Today
Having dealt with the development of stare decisis in
the United States and how it resulted in broader
interpretative powers for judges, we turn now to its use
today. Roscoe Pound defined stare decisis as a particular
technigue of decision making. As he explained:
Stare Decisis consists of finding the grounds of a
decision in reported judicial experience, making for
stability by reguiring adherence of the same guestion
in the past and allowing growth and change by freedom
of choice among competing analogies of egual authority
when new guestions arise or old ones take new forms. 6 ^
In the former chapter, we explained that precedent
plays a double role in the legal system. This view is also
reflected in Roscoe Pound's definition of stare decisis.
Precedent not only determines the rules for resolving legal
64 3 Va. 234, 236 (1792) .
65 3 POUND, supra note 6, at 566.
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disputes, but is the instrument of legal reasoning that
results in the development of new rules.
This section will deal with the use of precedent as a
source of rules for resolving controversies. Stare decisis
is followed in an attempt to give clarity and stability to
the system, by not disturbing what has been previously
settled. In this sense stare decisis could be considered, as
Justice Cardozo said, "an everyday working rule of the
law." 66
Stare decisis reguires a certain mode of reasoning,
that is, reasoning by example. This is not reasoning from
the whole to a part or from the part to the whole, but from
part to part. 67 In reasoning from example, the first step is
to determine the similarity between the case at hand and the
previous case. The judge next announces the rule of law
prescribed in the precedent. Finally, the judge applies the
rule to the new case by stating the reasons why both cases
are similar and why the rule should be applied. 68
This form of reasoning is the most common form of
resolving disputes in the American system. 69 The fact that
something was done before provides not only a reason for
doing it that way again, 70 but also a constraint. A judge
66 P.S. ATIYAH AND R.S. SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCES IN ANGLO-AMERICAN
LAW, A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LEGAL REASONING, LEGAL THEORY AND LEGAL
INSTITUTIONS 126 (1987).
BERYL HAROLD LEVY, CARDOZO AND THE FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THINKING 4 6
(1969)
.
68 Id. at 47.
69 ATIYAH & SUMMERS, supra note 66, at 12 8.
70 Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 Stanford Law Review 572 (1987).
31
knows that if he applies a given proposition to resolve a
dispute between these litigants today she will be obliged to
apply it in all similar cases. 71
Therefore, stare decisis gives effect to the principle
that, ceteris paribus, when situation A arises you ought to
do B. This is the same principle used in a civil law system
where a judge reasons from a general rule and applies it to
all similar cases. 72 In a common law system, once a judge
decides that the case at hand is similar to a previous case
he will apply the rule established in precedent. In the same
manner, once a civil law judge has determined that the case
at hand is ruled by a certain provision of the codes or the
Constitution he will resolve the case according to this
provision. The following cases, regarding freedom of speech,
provide useful examples of how this process works.
In American Booksellers v. Hudnut the court struck down
an ordinance that prohibited the sale of "pornography". The
ordinance was considered unconstitutional because it was not
content neutral. Rather, it prescribed an "approved view of
women, of how they may react to sexual encounters, of how
sexes may relate to each other." 73 This decision is based
on a series of precedents as the following excerpt of the
opinion demonstrates:
71 Id. at 578.
72 MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 47 (1991).
73 American Bookseller Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F. 2d 323, 324 (7th Cir,
1985) .
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Under the First Amendment the government must
leave to the people the evaluation of ideas. The ideas
of the Klan may be propagated. [Branderburg]
.
Communists may speak freely and run for office.
[DeJonge]. The Nazi Party may march through a city with
a large Jewish population. [Collin v. Smith]. People
may teach religions that others despise. People may
seek to repeal laws guaranteeing egual opportunity in
employment or to revoke the constitutional amendment
granting the vote to blacks and women. They may do this
because "above all else, the First Amendment means that
government has no power to restrict expression because
of its message or its ideas" [Police Department v.
Mosley]. 74
In a similar Mexican case, the court reasoned:
According to article six of the Constitution
expression of ideas will not be subject to
administrative or judicial inquisition except in cases
of moral turpitude, infringement of third parties
rights, criminal conduct or disturbance of the public
peace. It is evident that this constitutional guarantee
includes every artistic or cultural expression, since
art and culture are part of the citizen's expressions.
Therefore, it would be contrary to the constitutional
liberties that the authorities could impose artistic or
cultural values on the citizens as if the authorities
had more power than the Federal Constitution itself,
to decide what kind of culture is convenient. Adults
have a constitutional right to choose the artistic or
cultural expression they want to be exposed to. It
would be an absurd protectionism to impose in a whole
nation artistic or cultural patterns in violation of
the Constitution. 75
As these examples show, legal reasoning in both systems
is very similar. What is different is the premise from which
the Courts' reasoning starts. The American Court's decision
is based on precedents, while the Mexican opinion is founded
on article six of the Constitution. In other words, what is
different is only the formal source of law.
74 Id. at 325.
75 LIBERTAD DE EXPRESION EN MATERIA DE ARTE Y CULTURA S.J.F(e.g. 97-102,
7a 6, 144 1976)
.
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It is in this sense that precedent is a binding source
of rules in the American legal system. Precedent limits
judges by showing them what has been considered in the past
the appropriate form of resolving a certain type of
dispute. 76 Once the judge determines that the case at bench
is similar to a previous case, he is bound to that precedent
and should apply the rule established in it. Of course,
precedent will have more impact in a well elaborated field
(for example property law), than in a relatively new area
where all the necessary rules might not have been previously
set, and people are not as likely to have tailored their
acts to follow existing case law. 77 In either area, however,
a precedent carries force simply because it is precedent,
and (absent good cause for being overruled) establishes a
binding rule of law.
The doctrine of binding precedent not only constrains a
judge to follow her own precedents, but also those of
superior judges. Judges thus follow stare decisis in two
dimensions. Horizontal stare decisis obliges a judge to
follow her own precedents as well as the coordinate case law
of her jurisdiction. The reason for horizontal stare decisis
is to give consistency and coherence to the system.
The vertical dimension of stare decisis is based upon
the existence of judicial hierarchies within jurisdictions.
The decisions of the highest court in any jurisdiction
76 KARL LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 66 (1951)
77 LLEWELLYN, supra note 59, at 25.
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legally control all the courts below it. 78 The Supreme Court
of the United States is the only court not bound by vertical
stare decisis, since it is the court of last resort. On the
other hand, all the courts in the United States are bound by
the Supreme Court's decisions.
Despite the seemingly clear direction given by the
doctrine of stare decisis, following the doctrine is not
always an easy task. In fact, much has been written
regarding the problem of determining what law should control
a given case. One of the causes of this problem is the
ambiguity of language. Even though language is our most
developed form of communication, it is very imprecise. Any
word can have variable meanings; and long and complex
clusters of words necessarily invite interpretative
disputes. For this reason, some legal scholars doubt the
authority of case law. They argue that, due to the ambiguity
of language, precedent does not, in fact, constrain the
judge in his decisions. 79
In response to these objections, and in an attempt to
alleviate the ambiguity of language, legal experts have
developed the concepts of holding and ratio decidendi of a
case. These concepts are used to narrow the possible
interpretations of a precedent. 80
? CARTER, supra note 37, at 40.
Schauer, supra note 70, at 586.
80 Id. at 588.
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Holding
The holding of a case is the precise legal rule
applied in solving a dispute. In a common law system the
rules that derive from a precedent vary depending on how
narrow or broad the establishment of the rule by the
deciding court is. 81 The principle of stare decisis
prescribes that what is binding in a precedent is the
precise rule, or "holding," derived from the previous
opinion. 82
Two methods are often used to determine the holding of
a case. In the first method a judge announces the rule set
forth in precedent that seems directly applicable to the
case at hand and applies it. The second method consists in
determining which precedent is applicable to the case at
bench by focusing on the result. Judges interpret the
holding in a way that includes the present case, in order to
obtain the same result. 83
These methods share the same purpose, that is finding
the precise rule used in resolving a case. This is an
important process because the precise rule alone is what
binds courts in future decisions. Nevertheless, in order to
assure an equal application of the law, a judge should
consider the reasons given by the previous court for
81 EISENBERG, supra note 72, at 54
82 Id. at 51.
83 Id. at 52.
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applying the rule that forms the holding of the decision.
This reasoning is called the ratio decedendi of the case.
Ratio Decidendi
As MacCormick defines ratio decedendi, it "is a ruling
expressly or implicitly given by a judge which is sufficient
to settle a point of law put in issue by the parties." 84 The
ratio are the justifications of the judge's decision. These
justifications explain why the court applied a certain rule
in a given case.
The ratio decidendi is a general proposition that is
binding. The binding character of the ratio decedendi is
based on a concept of formal justice, that similar cases
should be treated alike. Consistent use of general rules, as
well as precise holdings, is essential to justify the
judge's decision. 85 At a same time, later courts are free to
re-express the justifications that underlie a precedent in
applying it to the case at hand. The use of precedent, as a
source of law, gives judges the possibility to determine the
extent of an earlier ruling by reinterpreting the previous
judge's justifications. 86
84 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 46, at 87.
85 Id. at 86.
86 For an example, see the analysis of the cases Sherlock v. Stillwater
Clinic, 260 N.W. 2d 169 (Min. 1977) and Christensen v. Thornby, 192 Min.
123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934), dealing with the limitations on the
responsibility of doctors for unsuccessful vasectomies that resulted in
unwanted pregnancies
.
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It is common to see a later narrowing of a ratio. This
narrowing is done when a later court finds new
circumstances, not foreseen by the original judge, that
require limiting the extent of the reasons used in the
former decision. 87 An excerpt of the case Bowers v.
Hardwick, where the Court held that the constitutional right
to privacy did not include a right to homosexuals to engage
in acts of consensual sodomy, provides a useful example:
It is true that despite the language of the Due Process
Clauses which appears to focus on the processes by
which life, liberty, or property is taken, the cases
are legion in which those Clauses have been interpreted
to have substantive content. Among such cases are those
recognizing rights that have little or no textual
support in the constitutional language. Meyer, Prince
and Pierce fall into this category, as do the privacy
cases from Griswold to Carey. Striving to assure itself
and the public that announcing rights not readily
identifiable in the Constitution's text involves much
more than the imposition of the Justices' own choice of
values on the States and the Federal Government, the
Court has sought to identify the nature of the rights
qualifying for heightened judicial protection. In Palko
it was said that this category includes those
fundamental liberties that are "implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty," such that "neither liberty nor
justice would exist if they were sacrificed." A
different description of fundamental liberties appeared
in Moore where they are characterized as those
liberties that are deeply rooted in this Nation's
history and tradition." It is obvious to us that
neither of these formulations would extend a
fundamental right to homosexuals to engage in acts of
consensual sodomy. 88
Many scholars discount the utility of ratios in
deciding real cases. In Julius Stone's opinion, "the
LLEWELLYN, supra note 59, at 14.
'Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 140, 145 (1986)
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existence of competing methods to determine the ratio of a
case and the difficulties of determining what are the
material facts" 89 make the idea of cases having ratio
decidendi unsustainable. "There is not one single ratio
decidendi," writes Stone, "which is necessary for explaining
a given decision." 90
Although it is true that sometimes it is not easy to
identify a ratio in a case, these objections should be put
in perspective. Neil MacCormick explains:
The dogma that every case must have a single clear
ratio decidendi is a fiction. But that no case has a
clear ratio that is a clear general principle that
leads to that decision is also false. Since judges
have to justify their decisions in many cases they act
based on some ruling which covers not only the past
case, but also other possible cases which are like
cases just because they would be covered by the same
ruling. When this occurs it makes sense to treat the
ruling given as the ratio decidendi of the case and to
use it as a rule for the future. 91
The important point to be drawn from this analysis is
that if the holding is the legal rule binding the future
judge, and the ratio are the reasons that justify the
application of the rule, then this method of resolving legal
disputes is very similar to a civil law system. In a civil
law system a judge is bound by a legal rule and is compelled
to give the reasons that justify the application of the rule
to the particular case.
89 JULIUS STONE, PRECEDENT AND LAW 15 (1985).
90 Id. at 16.
91 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 46, at 86.
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The difference between civil law and common law systems
is the source of the law. In this sense, legal reasoning in
both systems is the same. A common law judge uses the
holding of a precedent to resolve a case and states the
reasons why this precedent is applicable in the ratio
decidendi. Similarly, a civil law judge applies a rule
stated in a law and has the duty to explain the reasons for
this application. For example, articles 14 and 16 of the
Mexican Constitution provide that every decision should
clearly establish the legal precept applicable to the case
(this is the equivalent to the holding) and the reasons why
this rule is applicable (this is equivalent to the ratio
decidendi). 92 Moreover, the Mexican Supreme Court has held
that it is not enough that the judge simply cites the legal
precept applicable to the case at hand. It is necessary that
he state the reasons that led to the decision. 93
Dictum
Dictum is frequently defined as that which is not
holding or ratio in a case. Strictly, it is everything that
is not essential for resolving the case and has no binding
force.
Nevertheless the distinction between ratio and dictum,
the essential and inessential, is not easy. A decision is
92 Constitucion Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos 1917
arts. 14, 16.
93 SENTENCIAS, FUNDAMENTACION Y MOTIVACION DE LAS, S.J.F(e.g., 7a 4, 91
1969)
.
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not always a chain of thoughts; "it is more like a woven
fabric of different materials , so that it is very difficult
to determine exactly what is essential to resolve a
particular case." 94
Furthermore, there are different kinds of dicta
which can have a varying weight. Sometimes a dictum treats a
point that is closely related to the issue in the case, and
may become relevant in future decisions. On other occasions
a judge may give various reasons for resolving a certain
case, and it is not easy to determine which of these reasons
was essential. Sometimes the judge himself cannot say
whether he is giving expression to a ratio or a dictum. 95
This determination is left to future judges. The line
between dictum and ratio remains indistinct and in each case
is a matter of delicate discrimination.
Justification for the Use of Stare Decisis
The question that will be answered in this section is,
Why is it desirable to have binding precedent as a formal
source of law in the legal system?
Chief Justice Rehnquist defines stare decisis as an
important rule of formal justice that promotes the main
values of the system: fairness, stability, predictability
94 CARLETON KEMP ALLEN, LAW IN THE MAKING 260 (7th. ed. 1968
95 Id. at 266.
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and efficiency. 96 Stare decisis promotes equality in the
system by establishing a standard of formal justice that
requires that like cases be treated in like fashion. Courts
are obliged to resolve disputes by establishing rules that
are applicable, not only to the parties in the immediate
dispute, but also to all those who are similarly situated. 97
This universality of the rules permits, at least in a formal
sense, a just resolution of legal disputes.
Stare decisis also promotes stability in the system.
This principle gains the confidence of the public for case
law. 98 As a result of the doctrine of stare decisis it is
possible to know what the law is. People are capable of
planning their actions in accordance with established rules.
Stare decisis enables lawyers to anticipate judicial
action upon a like set of facts in future cases. "It
functions as a graph in which decisions are points that draw
a curve that becomes a principle applicable in the
future." 99 Not only lawyers, but members of society in
general, plan and perform many acts in reliance on the rules
set out in case law. Predictability is also desirable
because it minimizes the opportunities for judicial
caprice, 100 inasmuch as the judges are bound by precedent.
96 William H. Rehnquist: The Power that Shall be Vested In a Precedent:
Stare Decisis, The Constitution and the Supreme Court, 66 B.U.L Rev. 345
(1990) .
97 EISENBERG, supra note 72, at 9.
98 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 46, at 93.
99 PRICE & BITNER, supra note 45, 4.
100 Rehnquist, supra note 96, at 347.
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Efficiency is another justification for the rule of
precedent, it promotes expeditious solutions of legal
disputes. A quick solution is often as important as a just
one; great harm can be caused if a legal dispute is not
resolved seasonably.
Judicial economy is also a result of stare decisis.
Resort to precedent enables judges to dispose of cases more
readily, without having to re-examine the basis and
soundness of every rule of law in cases that come before
them. 101
In the same manner, the use of rules preestablished in
codes protects fairness, stability, predictability and
efficiency in a civil law system. For example, the Mexican
Constitution establishes in article 16, that no one can be
deprived of life, family, papers, or possessions except by a
written order that establishes the legal precepts applicable
and the reasoning for their application. And Article 17
prescribes that every person has a right to a expeditious
administration of justice, by the courts and in the terms
established by law. 102
In short, in both civil law and common law countries,
there is an emphasis on the creation of informative and
binding sources of law that advance such values as
evenhandedness and predictability. The difference between
101 ROBERT A. LEFLAR, APPELLATE JUDICIAL OPINION 30 (1974).
102 Constitucion Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos 1917
art. 16, 17.
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the systems lies in the premises from which legal reasoning
starts. In other words, the difference is in the preeminence
given to the particular formal source of law: to precedent
in a common law system and to codified statements of laws in
the civil systems.
Summary
Precedent is a source of law in the system because of
stare decisis. This principle prescribes the method of
reasoning from examples, constraining a judge to follow
precedent in solving legal disputes. What is binding in a
precedent is the legal rule, that is, the holding of the
case. Nevertheless, when applying a rule the judge must give
reasons for doing so. These justifications explain why the
rule was applicable to the case, this reasoning is called
the ratio decedendi of a case. The determination of the
holding and ratio of the case eases the application of
precedential rules to new cases.
The use of precedent as a source of law promotes
stability and predictability in the system. It results in
fast and efficient solutions of legal disputes and advances
justice by prescribing the egual treatment of like cases. In
Justice O'Connor's words, "the very concept of the rule of
law reguires such continuity over time that a respect for
precedent is by definition indispensable." 103
103 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S.
2791, 120, 124 (1991) .
CHAPTER IV
THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
AND THE ROLE OF PRECEDENT IN JUDGE-MADE LAW,
Introduction
In the preceding chapter we analyzed the use of
precedent as a source of law for solving disputes. Now we
turn to the second role of precedent in the judicial
process, the development of new rules and the interpretation
of old ones to fit new circumstances. This function allows
the system to respond to changes in society, as well as to
correct errors in adjudication.
We will deal with the nature of the judicial process,
the different methods of interpreting precedent, the impact
of constitutional rules and the great leeway judges possess
in applying precedent. Finally, we will review the important
role of judge-made law in keeping the legal system updated.
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Preventing Stare Decisis from Making the Legal System Unduly
Rigid
Stare decisis has found its justification in the need
for fairness, stability, predictability and efficiency in
the legal system. Stare decisis, however, also may become an
instrument of immobility. The application of the same rule,
decade after decade, long after conditions have changed rob
the rule of its force and can make stare decisis an
undesirable doctrine. 104 To avoid this problem "law must be
stable yet it cannot stand still." 105 It is through the
double function of case law that this balance between the
need for stability and continuous change in society can be
achieved.
Society changes rapidly, and new controversies arise
from the vast number of complex relationships that are part
of modern life. Conseguently , law must continuously grow.
When conditions change, precedents often become only a
starting point in a search for proper rules applicable to
present circumstances.
Reasoning from example allows the ideas of society "to
have a say in the shaping of law." 106 It is through lawyers'
work that these new ideas are introduced and discussed in
the courts. The ambiguity of language, found in precedent,
104 Gordon Post, Stare Decisis: The Use of Precedent, in READINGS IN
PHILOSOPHY 21, 19-31 (John Arthur and Shaw William 2d ed. 1993).
1
- ROSCOE POUND, LAW FINDING THROUGH EXPERIENCE AND REASON 23 (1960)
106 LEVI, supra note 27, at 5.
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gives an attorney an opportunity to persuade the judge that
the law can be interpreted in more than one sense. 107
The understanding of law as a group of rules that
change to fit the developing needs of society has
contributed to the increasing litigiousness of the American
people. In other words, American attorneys believe that they
can always make an argument that some law should be adapted
to resolve their client's wrong. 108
Reasoning from example also allows judges to change or
reformulate the meaning of words. Because society changes
continuously, words, not only in case law but also in
statutes and even in the Constitution, must acquire new
meanings. It is necessary that the law is worded in general
and sometimes ambiguous terms to adapt to future unforeseen
circumstances. For example, in Gibbons v. Ogden Chief
Justice Marshall interpreted the commerce clause109 of the
Constitution and determined that the meaning of the word
commerce included navigation:
The subject to be regulated is commerce. ... The
counsel for the appellee would limit it to traffic, to
buying and selling, or the interchange of commodities,
and does not admit that it comprehends navigation. This
would restrict a general term, applicable to many
objects, to one of its significations. Commerce
undoubtedly is traffic, but it is something more: it is
intercourse. It describes the commercial intercourse
between nations and parts of nations, in all of its
107 CARTER, supra note 37, at 39.
108 KLAFTER, supra note 60, at 119.
109 Congress shall have power. . . To regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among several States, and within the Indian Tribes. U.S,
CONST, art. I $8.
47
branches, and is regulated by prescribing rules for
carrying on that intercourse. 1 -1-
The ability of case law to adapt to changes through the
creation of new rules is of extreme importance, especially
if we take into account the limited capacity of the
legislature to respond to changes in society. Moreover, "the
enrichment of the supply of rules that affect private actors
is left almost in its entirety to judge made law." 111
Justice Cardozo makes a distinction between the static
and dynamic aspect of precedent. The first is used when the
judge is dealing with a controversy over the application of
a rule. The second is used when the controversy is over the
rule itself or the need to create some new rule. In this
case, the judge is free to change the law, but should do so
only for reasons that outweigh the public interest in law's
stability. 112 In these situations case law is the source of
new rules.
Sometimes case law changes as a result of perceived
errors in earlier adjudication. Judges, like other human
beings, make mistakes. Therefore, the possibility of
correcting erroneous decisions through case law must exist.
"Acting otherwise would have this consequence; because one
man has been wronged by a judicial determination every man,
having a like case, ought to be wronged also." 113
110 9 Wheat. U.S. 188 (1824).
111 EISENBERG, supra note 72, at 5.
112 BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 165 (1937)
113 Charles J. Cooper, Stare Decisis, Precedent and Principles in
Constitutional Adjudication, 73 Cornell L. Rev. 105 (1992).
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The foregoing discussion highlights the need for
flexibility in the system to adapt to evolving conditions
and to correct possible errors. Nevertheless, the
stabilizing effect of stare decisis should not be
underestimated. "This tension between stability and change,
is the core of the legal system. 1 * 114
Judges adapt the legal system to the changes in society
through interpretation. The method of interpretation and how
it results in the creation of rules will be the subject of
the next section.
Judicial Interpretation
The need for interpretation results from the ambiguity
of language. It also results from the competition among
values, in a legal system which cannot and does not rank all
values, in suggesting myriad solutions to an infinite number
of problems. The problems of ambiguity and competing values
are heightened by changing circumstances and the need to
adapt the law to present circumstances. The interpretation
that results from these forces generates judge made rules.
Precedents function as a frame within which the judge
chooses the most adeguate rule for present circumstances. 115
114 JOHN C. DERNBACH ET AL., PRACTICAL GUIDE TO LEGAL WRITING AND LEGAL
METHOD 23 (2d ed. 1994).
115 KELSEN, supra note 4, at 352.
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The Constitution vests interpretative authority in the
judicial branch by granting it power to decide cases and
controversies. 116 In interpreting precedents, however,
judges may choose among various methods. One of the
possibilities is the use of analogy. The court begins with a
rule, announced in a precedent, that it is not obviously
applicable to the case at hand. Then, the court proceeds to
explain that there is no good reason for treating this case
differently from the precedent. In other words, the court
gives reasons to support its belief that, the cases are
similar enough to be treated the same. In going through
this process, the court reformulates the rule so that it
includes the new case. 117 A court uses precedent as a source
of law; but in its reasoning it creates a new rule adapted
to the present controversy.
Another practice of American courts is distinguishing
previous cases. 118 Judges distinguish precedent only when
the circumstances in a particular case are such that
following precedent would result in an undesirable solution.
In order to distinguish precedent, judges limit the ambit of
its holding, so as not to regulate the present case. 119 In
taking this step, the Court refines the rule by narrowing
its possible applications, but acts within the framework
established by the previous and still binding precedent.
116 U.S. CONST, art. Ill, $2, cl . 2.
117 EISENBERG, supra note 72, at 87.
118 ATIYAH & SUMMERS, supra note 66, at 124.
:: EISENBERG, supra note 72, at 135.
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Perhaps the most potent tool for updating the legal
system is the power to overrule precedents. Overruling
occurs when the precedent is manifestly in error or has
become obsolete. In order to overrule a precedent, the
benefits of changing the rule should outweigh the costs of
not following stare decisis. Unless a substantial benefit
overcomes the loss of legal certainty associated with
overruling
,
precedents are not overruled. 120
The main reasons for overruling a precedent are poor
justification in the prior case; failure of the prior court
to understand the conseguences of the precedent; or
inconsistency with newly found moral or social values. 121
Again, in these cases the starting point is a precedent. The
court announces that it considers existing rules inadeguate
and proceeds to make changes to develop a new set of rules.
Although overruling decisions is useful in updating the
legal system, such drastic changes diminish the
predictability and certainty of the system.
A method for avoiding the negative conseguences of
overruling is the practice of signaling. It is a technigue
by which a court follows precedent, but puts the profession
on notice that precedent is no longer reliable. The court
does so by explaining that there might be important reasons
for changing the rule but that they do not outweigh the
benefits of stability at the present time. In the future,
120 STONE, supra note 89, at 169.
121 ATIYAH & SUMMERS, supra note 66, at 124
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however, the court may conclude that overruling has been
adequately signaled, and even make the new rule applicable
to the day when it was foreshadowed. 122
Courts also frequently use "transformation" 123 .
Transformation overrules precedent, but does so in a step-
by-step fashion. The court may carve out broad exceptions to
a rule set by precedent or it may recharacterize the rule,
over time to cover fewer and fewer cases. In either event by
the time the precedent is overruled, it has been
substantially eroded by previous cases. 124
Courts use these methods to update the legal system and
to correct earlier errors. The most relevant changes of this
kind usually concern constitutional law. Therefore we devote
special attention to the use of precedent in interpreting
the Constitution in order to confront the continuous changes
of society.
Constitutional Interpretation
It is very surprising that the American Constitution
has survived more than two hundred years with only twenty-
seven amendments. It is especially striking when compared
with a French Constitution that is only thirty-seven years
122 EISENBERG, supra note 50, at 122
123 Id. at 130.
124 Id. at 132.
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old, 125 or with the Mexican Constitution which is fifty-
eight years old and has had over four hundred reforms. 126
In its long history, the United States has grown from
thirteen colonies to one of the largest and most
heterogeneous nations of the world. The legal system surely
must have changed. So how can the words in the Constitution
be almost the same?
The answer to this guestion is found in case law, which
is used to interpret the Constitution and to adapt it to
changing circumstances. In Justice Cardozo's words:
The content of the constitutional immunities is not
constant but varies from age to age.... The needs of
successive generations may make restrictions imperative
today, which were vain and capricious to the vision of
past times. Remember Marshall's phrase "It is a11 ' nr<
inq."127Constitution we are expounding,
Marshall's principle cuts both ways. On the one hand,
it supports the need for flexibility in applying words that
are very general to adapt to the changes of time. 128 On the
other hand, even if generally worded, the Constitution sets
boundaries for the exercise of power.
Hence, it is through the development of case law that
the legal system, even at the constitutional level, responds
to the new demands of the nation. When scholars speak of
constitutional law, they commonly refer not only to the
125 La Constitution 1958.
126 Constitucion Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos 1917
127 CARDOZO, supra note 112, at 82.
128 LEVI, supra note 27, at 59.
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constitutional text, but also to the body of case law
developed in this area.
The purpose of constitutional interpretation is to
provide clear rules, frequently called "standards" that make
it easier to apply constitutional provisions to particular
cases. 129 A good example of such a standard is the formula
created by Holmes to limit freedom of speech when there is a
"clear and present danger" to the nation. 130 The freedom of
speech clause in the first Amendment reads: "Congress shall
make no law... abridging the freedom of speech". 131 Thus it
could be said that the freedom to express ideas or advocate
changes has no limits, so that the government is powerless
to prohibit any type of expression. In Schenck v. United
States, however, Holmes established that the First Amendment
has limits. People can express their ideas as long as they
do not represent a "clear and present danger" of the evils
government may address . In subsequent cases the court
continued to use this test, and subjected a variety of state
restrictions on speech to the Holmes' standard. 132 In this
way, the protection granted by the First Amendment became
limited through case law, and precedent provided an
125 SUSAN J. BRISON AND WALTER SIMOTT ARMSTRONG, CONTEMPORARY
PERSPECTIVES ON CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 2 (1993)
.
:3: Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 479 (1919), Schenk was condemn
for espionage for circulating a document believed to be able to cause
insurrection. The judgment was affirmed on the basis that Congress has a
right to prevent the use of words in such circumstances and of such a
nature that they create a clear and present danger that they will bring
about substantive evil.
131 U.S. CONST, amend I.
132 e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
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important source of rules in the application of
constitutional provision.
Judges have developed different techniques of
interpretation when dealing with constitutional law. Many
judges and theorists focus on the language of the
Constitution. The emphasis, according to these scholars,
should be in the text itself. 133 As stated by Justice
Frankfurter, "the ultimate touchstone of constitutionality
is the [written] Constitution itself and not what the Court
has said about it." 134
Another method commonly used in constitutional
adjudication is the appeal to the purpose of the framers of
the Constitution. Some legal experts claim that the only way
to justify a constitutional interpretation is to show that
it matches the framers' intention. One problem with this
approach lies in the difficulty of determining the framers'
precise intention. 135 The Constitution was written and
ratified by many people, and it is hard to see how they
could have had one intention. There is even documented
evidence of disagreements among the different framers.
Hence, it is difficult to determine whose intentions should
be taken into account. 136
Finally, many scholars say that the framers intended
to create a growing instrument that calls for continuing
133 LEVI, supra note 27, at 50.
134 Graves v. New York, 306 U.S. 466, 491 (1939)
135 BRISON, supra note 129, at 6.
136 Id. at 9.
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judicial refinement in the light of modern conditions. 137
For example, in order to determine the meaning of the clause
that prohibits "cruel and unusual punishment" in the Eighth
Amendment it seems necessary to take into account current
moral and social values, because what is cruel or unusual
today very likely was not regarded as such two hundred years
ago. Consequently, the very language of the Eighth Amendment
suggests that the conduct regulated by this clause varies,
although the phrase is the same. 138
The need to adapt the Constitution to current
conditions becomes especially important when we take into
account the difficulty of adopting Constitutional
amendments. The special procedure set out in the
Constitution to enact an amendment — which in general
requires the approval of two thirds of both Houses of
Congress and three-quarters of the state's legislatures —
makes the process burdensome and slow. 139 Hence, a
interpretation of the Constitution accomplished through
case law has become a cardinal element of the legal system.
The foregoing discussion shows that no single method of
constitutional interpretation can adequately solve all
disputes. The open texture of the language in the
Constitution leaves courts with little choice but to take
137 LEVI, supra note 27, at 59.
138 Dan Coenen, Curious Role of Interpretative Formality in American
Constitutional Law, in PRESCRIPTIVE FORMALITY AND NORMATIVE RATIONALITY
IN MODERN LEGAL SYSTEMS 433 (Duncker & Humblot ed. , 1994).
139 U.S. CONST, art. V.
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into account history, moral values or politics in order to
give meaning to its provisions. Conseguently , constitutional
adjudication is built around balancing, in which appeals to
the text, purposes and policy are all important. 140
Many scholars argue that the vast interpretative powers
which mark constitutional decisionmaking leave stare decisis
with only a limited role. 141 Nevertheless, stare decisis
plays an important role in constitutional law. In
particular, it limits the cases that the Supreme Court
reviews, because "many constitutional issues are so far
settled that they are simply off the agenda." 142 The Supreme
Court will not reexamine the merits of these issues because,
as John Rawls explains:
Stability and continuity of the political institutions
and of the shared values are important goals of the
process of constitutional adjudication, particularly in
a "Constitution intended to endure for ages to come and
consequently to be adapted to the various crises of
human affairs". 143
Thus, once the Court considers an issue settled, it
will not review a case regarding that issue. Moreover, many
issues are placed "off the agenda" because of considerations
of stability and continuity. An adherence to this approach
is illustrated by a case resolved ten years after Roe v.
Wade, in which the Court wrote:
140 Coenen, supra note 138, at 440.
141 BRISON, supra note 129, at 12.
142 Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication,
in INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION 274 (Jack N. Rakove ed. 1990)
.
143 John Rawls, The Idea of Overlapping Consensus , 1 Oxford J. Legal
Stud. I, I (1987).
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....Arguments continue to be made... that we erred in
interpreting the Constitution. Nonetheless, the
doctrine of Stare Decisis while perhaps never entirely
persuasive on a constitutional question, is a doctrine
that demands respect in a society governed by the rule
of law. We respect it today and reaffirm Roe v.
Wade. 1 **
The use of judge-made law to give content to
constitutional provisions and the later application of the
rules created through case law highlight the importance of
precedent as a source of law. The powers granted to the
judicial branch allow judges to interpret and update the law
without legislative intervention. In doing so, however,
judges must and do balance the need for adaptation with the
need to preserve stability and continuity in the legal
system. 145
The Use of Morals , Policy, History, Tradition and Legal
Theory as Part of the Reasoning in the Judicial Process
The judicial process is a process of argumentation and
justification146 in which the judge explains the rules and
reasons for her decision. In this process many variables
come into play. History, legal theory, social mores,
economic considerations and political reasons are all part
144 City of Akron v. Akron Center of Reproductive Health, Inc., 462,
U.S. 419-20 (1983)
.
145 Coenen, supra note 138, at 435.
146 MACCORMICK, supra note 1, at 15.
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of the justifications asserted by judges when creating the
rules necessary for resolving a dispute.
Julius Stone says that it is through the introduction
of this type of reasoning that law develops and grows. 147
The use of history, theory, economics or politics allows the
changing values of the community into the legal system. When
necessary it produces new interpretations of old rules, new
sub-rules or entirely new rules. 148 Nevertheless, these
values become legally binding only after they are
established in case law; in other words, when they become
part of a formal source of law. In the following pages we
will deal with the use of these values in the judicial
process and how they become part of judge-made law.
Moral Values
Moral values largely shape the perceptions of the
American legal community as to what constitutes an injury
and a right. 149 Justice Cardozo defined moral values as,
"What I may reasonably believe that some other man of normal
intellect and conscience might reasonably look upon as
right." 150 Such prevailing standards of wrong and right
figure in the judicial process in pervasive ways. "There is
a constant presumption throughout the law", wrote Cardozo,
"that the evolution of habits fix the limits of right and
147 STONE, supra note 89, at 31.
148 STONE, supra note 89, at 32.
149 EISENBERG, supra note 72, at 43,
150 CARDOZO, supra note 112, at 89.
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wrong and although they cannot be taken automatically to
shape rules, it is in them that judges must seek a guide to
such an end." 151
The controversial case concerning abortion regulation,
Roe v. Wade, provides one of the best examples of a dispute
in which the court took account the changing views of
society. The following excerpt of the opinion illustrates
this type of reasoning.
"... The modern official belief of the Catholic Church,
recognizing the existence of life from the moment of
conception, is a view strongly held by many
noncatholics as well, and by many physicians.
Substantial problems for precise definition of this
view are posed, however, by new embryological data that
purport to indicate that conception is a process, over
time rather than an event." 15 ^
Policy
In many circumstances judges consider social welfare
and public policy in order to resolve a dispute correctly.
In some cases, the judge uses policy reasons to justify the
application of a certain rule. In others, policy concerns
may lead to the establishment of completely new rules. 153 In
both instances these rules are shaped for the future through
the use of case law.
These policy-centered justifications are freguently
seen in cases that involve social welfare or health issues.
In Nebbia v. New York, the court held that "the Due Process
151 Id. at 90.
152 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 93 (1973),
153 EISENBERG, supra note 72, at 27
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Clause requires only that the law should not be
unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious," and that the means
selected have a real and substantial connection to the
objective sought. 154 As a result, a state — which
presumably has greater expertise than the courts in
investigating and evaluating such matters— can adopt any
economic policy it may reasonably consider will promote the
public welfare.
History and Tradition
History also plays an important role in legal
reasoning. In interpreting or creating a rule, judges
frequently turn to the historical reasons that either led to
the creation of the rule or that show the need for a change.
An analysis of the legal history in the regulation of sodomy
and homosexual relationships played an important role in the
decision of the case Bowers v. Hardwick:^- 55
Proscription against sodomy has ancient roots.
Sodomy was a criminal offense at common law and was
forbidden by the law of the original thirteen States
when they ratified the Bill of Rights. In 1868, when
the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, all but five of
the thirty-seven States of the Union had a criminal
sodomy law. In fact, until 1961, all States outlawed
sodomy, and today, twenty-four states and the District
of Columbia continue to provide criminal penalties for
sodomy performed in private and between consenting
adults. Against this background, to claim that a right
154 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934), In this case, the Court
sustained a regulatory scheme for fixing milk prices.
155 Bowers v. Hardwick 478 U.S. 140,142 (1986). In this case the court
held that the Constitution does not grant a fundamental right to
homosexuals to engage in sodomy.
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to engage in such conduct is "deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and tradition or implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty" is, at best facetious.
Closely related to historical reasons are
justifications based on tradition. For example, the
determination of what liberties are considered fundamental
in American society usually depends on traditional practice.
Justice Goldberg in Griswold v. Connecticut explained that
in order to decide if a certain practice should receive
constitutional protection, "we must look to the traditions
and the collective conscience of our people to determine
whether a principle is so rooted there as to be ranked
fundamental." 156 In this sense, history and tradition play
an important role in constitutional adjudication.
Legal Theory
American judges also use scholars' writings as aids in
interpreting and creating rules. As Roscoe Pound explained,
legal theory and judicial writing are closely related in the
American system. This results in part from the fact that
many judges have also been legal scholars. 157 For example,
Justices Cardozo and Holmes, became known not only for
their judicial opinions, but also for their academic
writings. Justice Holmes' metaphor of "the market place of
ideas", a concept that is still widely used in assessing
freedom-of-speech issues, was derived from the philosophical
156 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, (1956)
157 POUND, supra note 105, at 25.
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conceptions of the time, which were influenced by thinkers
such as John Milton and John Stuart Mill. 158
Legal writings also provide important aids in
interpreting precedent. 159 The following extract from the
dissent in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul Minnesota, which
directly cites a law review article, is a good example.
Although the First Amendment broadly protects speech
it does not protect the right to "fix prices, breach
contracts, make false warranties, place bets with
bookies, threaten or extort." Schauer, Categories and
the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 Vand L.
Rev. 265 (1981). 160
The foregoing discussion highlights how moral values,
policy analysis, history, tradition and theory contribute to
the formulation of binding judge made law. The consultation
of these considerations permits judges to fulfill their
important duty of keeping the law updated and in accordance
with the needs of society.
The Role of Judges in the Legal System of the United States
"Judges should be considered social engineers; they do
not only apply the law as unchangeable formulas, but also
they create new rules." 161 Because precedent is the
preeminent source of law in the American legal system,
judges must have a pragmatic attitude toward their role. As
158 G. GUNTER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1000 (12th. ed. 1991).
159 EISENBERG, supra note 72, at 97.
160 R.A.V. v City of St. Paul Minnesota, 504 U.S. 112, 115 (1992).
161 3 POUND, supra note 6, at 42.
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Justice Cardozo put it, the "juristic philosophy of the
common law is at bottom the philosophy of pragmatism." 162
This pragmatic attitude requires judges to keep the law up
to date by continually restating the rules so as to give
them new content. 163
Judges have created such an immense body of case-law
that it has become is the preeminent source of law in the
common law system. Indeed some scholars claim that all law
is "judge-made law"; "accordingly judges, lawyers and law
professors are centrally concerned with judicial
decisions.
"
164
Klafter points out that as a result of the
litigiousness of the American people and the willingness of
judges to make law, "the judicial branch has acquired a
unique partnership with the legislative and executive branch
in governing the country." 165
For example, as we noted previously, the Mexican
Constitution expressly sets the limits on freedom of speech
by establishing that the expression of ideas will not be
subject to administrative or judicial inquisition except in
case of moral turpitude, infringement of third parties
rights, criminal conduct or disturbance of the public
peace. 166 A review of American case-law shows that the
162 CARDOZO, supra note 112, at 102.
163 Id. at 135
164 Monaghan, supra note 142, at 290.
165 KLAFTER, supra note 60, at 120.
166 Constitucion Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, art. 6,
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freedom of speech clause of the First Amendment, although
absolutist in its terms, has been interpreted by the Supreme
Court to embody almost the same limitations. 167 What is
different in the two legal systems is not so much the
content of the limitations, but the source of these
limitations. In the case of the Mexican legal system, they
emerge from the constitutional text, while in the American
system they emerge from constitutional case law.
In general , when changes are reguired in the American
system they are accomplished through the use of case law. On
the other hand, in the Mexican system constitutional
amendments are freguent. Thus, in the legal system of the
United States, precedent not only provides a starting point
in solving disputes; but it also provides a tool for
updating the legal system. As Dean Roscoe Pound once stated:
The chief cause of the success of the common law
doctrine of precedents as a form of law is that it
combines certainty and power of growth as no other
doctrine has been able to do. 168
167 See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), and Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 419 (1973), establishing that obscene material is
not protected by the first amendment. Brandburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444,430 (1969), holding that speech advocating, inciting or producing
lawlessness can be proscribed. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568
(1942), proscribing words that provoke to whom they are said retaliation
by acts of violence. Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 295 (1951), upheld
the conviction of a speaker because of incitement to riot that the
police where trying to prevent.
168 POUND, supra note 105, at 227.
CHAPTER V
THE INTERPLAY OF PRECEDENT AND STATUTES
AS SOURCES OF LAW
Introduction
The last fifty to eighty years have seen a fundamental
change in the law of the United States. In this time we
have gone from a legal system dominated by the common
law decided by courts to one in which statutes enacted
by the legislature have become the primary source of
law. 169
Although it is true that this century has been
characterized by a proliferation of statutes in the American
legal system, it is doubtful that they have become the
primary source of law. As already explained, precedents play
the preeminent role in the legal system not only in the
application of the law to particular cases, but also in
interpreting and updating the legal system.
In this chapter, we will deal with the relationship
between statutes and precedent. We will analyze how case law
is used to interpret statutes , to apply statutes to
particular legal disputes, and to update legislation. We
will address the role of judge made law in constitutional
review of legislation. Finally, we will explain the reasons
why precedent remains the preeminent source of law despite
the increase in the number of statutes.
169 GUIDO CALABRIESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 1 (1982)
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Statutes as Sources of Law
In the beginning of this work we defined statutes as
one of the sources of law of the American legal system. At
the national level, this source of rules emerged from the
legislative powers the Constitution granted to Congress. As
a result of the technological development and the complexity
of society's institutions in the twentieth century, statutes
govern vast areas of law. Today statutes supplemented by
quasi-statutorial administrative regulations regulate areas
such as stock markets and environmental control. 170
Despite the increase in statutes, they still directly
and explicitly cover such a small a fraction of cases that
judges often must extract the controlling rule of law for a
legal dispute from case law. 171 The frequent need to resort
to case law in statutory fields results in part from the
effective delegation of regulatory power from Congress to
the courts. In 1908, Dean Roscoe Pound explained "that the
legislature often makes statutes as bare outlines leaving it
to judges to define details of vital importance." 172 For
example:
In 1890 a nearly unanimous Congress passed with
very little debate the Sherman Antitrust Act. Its first
two sections stated: (1) "Every contract combination in
the form of a trust or otherwise or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several
170 Id. at 3.
171 LLEWELLYN, supra note 59, at 14.
172 Roscoe Pound, Courts and Legislation, 21 Harvard Law Review 383
(1908) .
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States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to
be illegal"; and (2) " Every person who shall
monopolize, or attempt to monopolize any part of the
trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a
misdemeanor..." Such general language leaves to judges
much freedom to shape and refine law. 173
The same phenomenon exists today because the forces
that create legislative open-endedness continue to operate
in modern legislative chambers. Most important, legislatures
often enact statutes in response to political pressures, in
an attempt to reflect legislative attentiveness to pressing
social problems. 174 Yet vagueness in statutory terms often
is necessary to obtain the approval of all the groups that
otherwise could block the enactment of such a law. 175 In
other words, legislatures deliberately use ambiguous
language in statutes "not simply to bring many factual
scenarios under one policy roof, but also to allow room for
the compromises often necessary for a majority vote." 176
Professor Levi explains that "many times as a result of
political controversies statutes end up being a group of
empty formulas." 177
Statutory ambiguity is also necessary because a
legislature cannot foresee all possible cases a statute may
regulate. Thus, the language of a statute should leave room
for interpretation. Once written, the words of the statute
173 CARTER, supra note 37, at 17.
174 Id. at 38.
175 CALABRIESI, supra note 169, at 32
176 CARTER, supra note 37, at 142.
177 LEVI, supra note 27, at 34.
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are fixed, but due to the open texture of language courts
can adapt the statute when applying it to individual cases.
The Relationship Between Statutes and Precedents
Although statutes regulate many new areas of law, case
law determines their applicability to a particular legal
dispute. As Justice Frankfurter stated in his dissent in
National City Bank v. Republic of China
,
178
"[s]tatutes are
not to be deemed self enclosed instances; they are to be
regarded as starting points of reasoning." 179
Judges must approach statutes as sources of law in the
same manner they do precedents. In Coke's words:
The surest construction of a statute is by the rule and
reason of the common law. In other words, it should be
construed so as to fit into the legal system of which
it is part. Statute and common law should be construed
together. 180
Roscoe Pound explains that Coke's idea has been
accepted as one of the principles ruling the American legal
system. 181 Case law serves three functions with respect to
statutes. First, case law interprets the provisions of a
statute to make them applicable to a particular dispute.
Second, case law updates a statute to adapt it to society's
178 348 U.S. 360 (1955)
.
179 Id. at 364.
180 SIR. EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES 138 (Thomas and Fraser ed. 1826)
181 Pound, supra note 172, at 401.
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changing circumstances. Lastly, case law ensures that
statutes are constitutional.
Interpretation of Statutes
Judges must consider statutes as sources of rules and
take them into account in their legal reasoning. When
dealing with statutes, however, the judge interprets their
applicable provisions and adapts them to the particular
dispute. Once a court has interpreted a statute in a
definite manner, a lower court must follow the new rules
created in the precedent. The judge in the later case is
not free to interpret the statute directly. 182 The
interpretation done through case law is not mere dictum;
precedents give direction to statutes that courts must
follow. 183
Courts use two main methods to interpret statutes. The
first is to look to the "plain meaning" of the words. 184 The
judge recognizes that the legislature is entitled to set the
frame of the public policy and that the text it votes for
represents this policy. Nevertheless, judges act freely
within this frame in ascertaining the precise meaning of the
words of a statute to make the rule applicable to a
particular case. 185 Judicial interpretation, in this
context, attempts to fix the meaning of the words in a
182 FARNSWORTH, supra note 14, at 70.
183 id. at 34.
184 CARTER, supra note 37, at 209.
185 Id.
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statute. Once that the meaning is fixed, the courts decide
subsequent cases based upon the meaning set out in
precedent.
The words of an Act frequently acquire a precise
meaning through their analysis in precedents. A useful
example is the series of cases that dealt with the meaning
of the phrase "for any immoral purpose" of the Mann Act.
Although the law was enacted to prevent white slave traffic
only, the court interpreted the phrase "for any immoral
purpose" (in keeping with its perceived plain meaning) to
include voluntary prostitution and polygamy. 186 Thus in
Caminetti v. United States the Supreme Court applied the
phrase "for any immoral purpose" to the voluntary
transportation of women for the purpose of paid cohabitation
or for becoming mistresses and concubines. 187 In this way,
the scope of situations that were regulated by the clause
"for any immoral purposes" became defined in case law. The
Mann Act only established the general frame in which judges
determined the specific situations that were covered by
it. 188
The second method of interpretation is to seek out
legislative intent. Judges frequently analyze the purpose of
the regulation by studying congressional hearings, committee
LEVI, supra note 27, at 33-53.
Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917).
See United States v. Beach, 324 U.S. 193 (1945). This case involved
the transportation of a prostitute in a taxi. Cleveland v. United
States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946). The defendants were Mormons who lived in
polygamy.
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reports and information provided by lobbyists in an attempt
to determine the meaning of the regulation. 189 They will
also consider the evil which the statute was designed to
remedy, and how the legislature dealt with it. 190
The difficulties of discerning legislative intent are
significant. Congress is formed of a group of people with
very different political backgrounds and interests; hence
their purposes in enacting legislation may vary. 191
Furthermore, intent is always a state of mind which is not
easy to decipher. 192 As Justice Jackson explained:
Although statutory construction rules serve as aids in
deciphering legislative intent, they long have been
subordinated to the doctrine that courts will construe
the details of an Act in conformity with its dominating
general purpose, will read text in light of the context
and will interpret the text so far as the meaning of
the words fairly permit so as to carry out in
particular cases the general expressed legislative
policy. 193
The judges' role in interpreting statutes is so
important that some scholars, such as Hurst, are of the
opinion that "all the law is judge-made law. The shape in
which a statute is imposed on the community as a guide of
conduct is that statute as interpreted by the courts. The
courts put life into the dead words of a statute." 194
189 JAMES W. HURST, DEALING WITH STATUTES 44 (1982).
190 Id. at 52.
191 Id. at 60.
192 CARTER, supra note 37, at 103.
193 Securities and Exchange Commission v. CM. Joiner Leasing
Corporation, 320 U.S. 344, 350 (1943).
194 HURST, supra note 189, at 31.
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Updating of Statutes
As we have seen in the previous chapter, case law is an
important tool in the evolution of the legal system. As a
result of changes in society, laws become obsolete. 195
Conseguently, the courts freguently update statutes through
the use of case law.
In seeking to adapt statutes to modern considerations,
courts must honor legislative supremacy. Nevertheless,
because judges regard law as practical , they view themselves
as having a crucial role in keeping statutory law in tune
with modern conditions. 196
The following extract, from one of Justice Cardozo's
opinions, clearly illustrates this practical attitude
towards statutory law.
Statutes are to be viewed, not in isolation or in
vacuo, as pronouncements of abstract principles for
guidance of an ideal community, but in the setting and
the framework of present day conditions as revealed by
the labors of economists and students of the social
sciences in our own country and abroad. 197
Although Congress has the power to amend any statute,
many statutes are left unaltered for decades. Thus courts
need to update the rules to apply them to new legal
disputes. 198 The updating of statutes is done through the
traditional judicial methods and modes of reasoning.
Conseguently, the direct source of law, even when
195 CALABRIESI, supra note 169, at 89.
196 CALABRIESI, supra note 169, at 6.
197 CARDOZO, supra note 112, at 81.
198 CALABRIESI, supra note 169, at 88.
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statutes exist, frequently is precedent. Changes in society
compel judges to create rules applicable to the new
circumstances. Hence, the preeminent source of law, when
updating is required, often is case law.
The Constitutionality of Statutes
Supreme Court justices exercise vast powers of
constitutional review of legislation. In the United States,
the judicial branch has the authority to decide upon the
constitutionality of every act of Congress. Hence, judicial
judgment is the chief factor in deciding the limits of
legislative competence. 199 In this sense too, judge-made law
enjoys a preeminent role in the legal system.
The power to control the constitutionality of statutes
is not limitless. When declaring a statute void the Court
must provide reasons explaining why the legislative act is
not created in accordance with the Constitution. Justice
Robert describes the process as "one in which the article of
the Constitution is laid beside the statute which is
challenged. The court then decides if the latter squares
with the former." 200
Notably, in issuing constitutional rulings the Court is
more willing to abandon precedent than in revising prior
interpretations of statutory enactment. For example:
199 LEVI, supra note 27, at 46.
200 United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 62 (1936)
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In Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), Justice
Brandeis held the Judiciary Act to have been
incorrectly interpreted. The opinion rests in part on
the research of a "competent scholar" as to the intent
of Congress. But Justice Brandeis was careful to say
that the erroneous doctrine would not be abandoned if
it were only a matter of statutory interpretation. It
was the "unconstitutionality of the course pursued"
which "compels us to do so." 201
In reality, this process of testing a challenged
statute against "the article of the Constitution" requires
frequent resort, and adherence to, judicial precedent.
Again, what we face is a situation in which balancing the
values promoted by stare decisis and the need for change in
society is essential. In this balancing, case law plays a
preeminent role.
The Preeminent Role of Precedent in the Legal System of the
United States.
Pound explains that lawyers and judges usually prefer
precedents as sources of law. This has led to a very strict
reading of statutes, especially when the statute reforms the
law on some point. 202 Even in areas regulated almost in
their entirety by statutes, the legal community uses case
law as the main source of law. 203
Moreover, the legal system has developed a method which
permits immediate incorporation of case law into statutes.
201 LEVI, supra note 27, at 57.
202 Pound supra note 105, at 667.
203 Id.
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The opinions become in effect part of the statute which they
interpret. The great merit of the binding interpretative
decisions is that once a decision is rendered legislatures
are put on notice of the meaning which judges will assign to
the statute. Congress may change the interpretation by
amending the provisions, but this seldom occurs. 204
Therefore, the law that is directly applied in most cases is
precedent as incorporated in the statute. This process is
illustrated by cases like Scheriber v. Burlington Northern,
Inc., in which the Supreme Court established the meaning of
Section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, by
citing a precedent that had interpreted another section of
the act that used similar language. 205
An unusual example of the incorporation of precedents
in the application of statutes is section 1(b) of the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, which explicitly
alludes to judicial precedents as part of the regulatory
scheme. In particular, section 1(b) establishes that the
purpose of the Act is to restore the compelling state
interest test set forth in Sherbert v. Verner , 374 U.S. 398
(1963) 206 and Wisconsin v. Yoder , 406 U.S. 205 (1972) 207 so
204 Id. at 669.
205 Scheriber v. Burlington Northern Inc., 427 U.S. 1 (1985).
206 In this case the Court struck down a statute that denied
unemployment compensation benefits to a person because they could not
work on Saturdays. The court held that the statute unduly burdened the
individual's religious beliefs without a compelling state's interest and
that there existed less restrictive alternatives to achieve the state's
purpose.
207 In this case a statute compelling parents to send their children to
school until age 16, as applied to a Amish child, was considered
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as to guarantee its application in all cases where free
exercise of religion is substantially burdened. 208
In sum, precedents play the preeminent role in the
application of statutes in the American legal system.
Judicial opinions give meaning to all types of legal rules.
A judge who chooses to interpret a statute in a certain way
creates a precedent that judges in future, similar cases
will use in their decisions. Judges use case law to
interpret and update statutes, as well as to determine a
statute's constitutionality. Therefore, "interpreting a
statute is quite often a matter of interpreting in the light
of the glosses already imposed by precedents." 209
unconstitutional, because the state failed to prove a compelling
interest.
208 Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 103 P.L. 141, *2:1993
H.R. 1308; 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) .
209 MACCORMICK, supra note 1, at 213.
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
The main formal sources of law of the legal system of
the United States are the Constitution, statutory law and
case law. Among these sources of binding rules precedent
plays a preeminent role, since the applicability of
constitutional and statutory law greatly depend on the
interpretation undertaken by judges. Moreover case law, by
itself, establishes all of the common law. In this area of
the legal system, judge-made law is the only source of
rules.
Precedent is a formal source of law in the system
because of the principle of stare decisis. This principle
prescribes the method of reasoning from example,
constraining the judge to follow precedent in solving legal
disputes. Once a judge determines that a case is similar to
a previous case, he applies the rule set in precedent and
resolves the dispute accordingly. The principle of stare
decisis promotes stability and predictability in the system.
It results in fast and efficient solutions of legal disputes
and promotes justice by prescribing the equal treatment of
like cases. This has led to the belief that respect for
precedent is indispensable to assure continuity in the
system.
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On the other hand, the judicial process must balance
stability with the need to adapt to changes in society.
Therefore, judicial interpretation plays an essential role
in the development of law. Case law not only serves as a
guide in the search for applicable rules, but also brings
new rules into being.
It is through case law that the judges fulfill the
important duty of keeping the law updated and in accordance
with the needs of society. As a result of the important
role of judge-made law in updating and adapting the rules
of the American legal system, the judicial branch has
assumed a powerful role in governing the country.
Although this century has been characterized by a
proliferation of statutes, precedent plays a preeminent
role in the application of the statutory rules to
particular cases. Moreover, judges are responsible for
updating statutes and for constitutional review of
legislation. Therefore, although large areas of law are
regulated by statutes, their interpretation and review for
constitutionality often involve the use of precedents.
In this thesis we have sought to describe the
preeminent role precedent plays in the American legal
system. Case-law is essential not only in the solution of
legal disputes, but also in the evolution of the legal
system.
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In Professor Llewellyn's words, "It is prior decisions
of judges that constitute the primary material for all law-
related activity". 210
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